The Big Questions: Part Two

There were certain things that Gromyko didn't agree with Gorbachev about. Gromyko, who had been in so very many foreign nations during his tenure, was slightly put-off or jealous of the glowing reviews that Mikhail Gorbachev had received during a tour of Britain in December 1984. This was the time that Thatcher expressed her "I like Mr Gorbachev; we can do business together" opinion. Andrei Gromyko's own son, Anatoly, was a strong Gorbachev supporter. Gromyko was nothing if not a realist. He simply reviewed the situation and decided the age of the dinosaurs was over. By helping Gorbachev win the post of general secretary, Gromyko would be the elder statesman of the USSR. Several minutes before the arrival of everyone else, Gromyko and Gorbachev met in the Walnut Room. Gorbachev told Gromyko, "We have to unite our forces. This is a critical moment." In reply Gromyko said, "It seems to me that everything is clear." Mikhail Gorbachev was now completely confident he had Gromyko's support and finally stated, "I am counting on the fact that you and I will cooperate."

Gorbachev then offered Viktor Grishin what would appear to us in the West as a consolation prize. However, in the Byzantine world of Soviet politics things were never quite so clear cut. Gorbachev had offered Grishin the chairmanship of Chernenko's Funeral Commission. Grishin may have been crooked but he was no dummy. If he accepted this prestigious but only symbolic position he might appear to be making yet another bid for power. If his Kremlin colleagues perceive him as too overreaching it could have dire consequences for his political career. Grishin told Gorbachev something to the effect that the Funeral Commission position usually went to the person acting in the general secretary's place when he couldn't be present, which had been Gorbachev himself. Grishin urged Gorbachev to handle the job in hopes that some of the old guard would resist him. Gorbachev who had just turned 54 on 2 March 1985, was indeed the "baby" of the Politburo-but was no fool either. He thought that his power base would expand and said to Grishin, "There's no need to hurry. Let's think about this carefully overnight."

When Gorbachev entered the Politburo Room, he still kept a respectful distance from the now empty general secretary's seat. The mood in the room was still guarded-more like "The king is dead" instead of "Long live the king." The men listened to a number of minor matters including the medical report about the death of Konstantin Chernenko. They prepared an obituary for him, picked a date for the funeral and began summoning members of he policy making Central Committee to Moscow. Then Gromyko made his move. He insisted that Gorbachev be appointed chairman of the Funeral Commission. This was Gromyko's way of saying in no uncertain terms that he supported Gorbachev's bid to become general secretary. There were a few dissenting voices about the unnecessary speed of his suggestion but no one opposed his proposal. Along with Andrei Gromyko, Gorbachev had another indispensable supporter from when Gorbachev had worked in the Central Committee in Moscow. This man's name was Yegor Ligachev, and he was the secretary in charge of cadres. Ligachev was another Andropov appointee who had been chosen for his Siberian toughness and appetite for hard work to purge the party of incompetent officials.

Ligachev, like Gorbachev was appalled at the corruption and drift of the Brezhnev years. Over the last three years, Ligachev had been traveling all over the Soviet Union replacing old Brezhnev cadres with younger men. Ligachev knew the ins and outs of the network of party officials who ran the nation on a day to day basis. 40 percent of the seats on the Central Committee were held by these regional party bosses. Back in 1964 these were the same kind of men who played a major role in ousting Nikita Khrushchev. This fact could become critical. If there was a deadlock in the Politburo, which there would be if Viktor Grishin continued his drive for power, the decision of these men and women would be decisive. Yegor Ligachev had counted heads-they were almost all in favor of Gorbachev by a great percentage.

Then there is another item of interest in our story here. Two long time Brezhnev cronies, who most likely would have supported Grishin were absent from the crucial meeting. The Ukrainian Communist Party boss, Vladimir V. Scherbitsky, was in San Francisco on an official visit. His flight home was mysteriously delayed-until the question of who would be the next gensek had been decided. Dinmukhhamed Kunayev, the Communist Party boss of Kazakhstan and a longtime Brezhnev colleague didn't get to Moscow from Alma Ata until the day after the leadership question had been decided. There wasn't much said about Kunayev's late arrival but Kremlin watchers and conspiracy theorists suspected a plot by the pro-Gorbachev forces to delay Scherbitsky's plane in San Francisco. This incident could have simply been timing-or simple cooincidence but as always for me anyway gives something to wonder about.

Might Soviet and perhaps world history been vastly different with Communist Party General Secretary Viktor Grishin instead of Mikhail Gorbachev? Would the Cold War between the superpowers have heated up further-maybe even becoming a "hot" war? Or would the superpowers simply have continued to walk the tightrope above nuclear holocaust as they already had for so many years? After Grishin would a reformer have arrived on the scene anyway-but maybe in the 90s instead of the 80s? There is much speculation about this question to people who study the "what ifs" or "might have beens" of history. Many of the men who helped Gorbachev originally insisted that they never realized how far he would take things, and blamed him for letting the reforms get out of control and thus ending the Soviet Union. This group of men includes Yegor Ligachev, who by 1988 was quite bitter about how far Mikhail Gorbachev had gone. Some say with or without reform the Soviet Union would have been gone anyway. I haven't yet made up my mind about this question and it may be one that is unknowable to any degree of satisfaction. One thing I do think is that the Soviet Union could have staggered on much longer than the early nineties without reform-doomed eventually maybe-but not as quickly as some analysts would have it. Finally, I would be fascinated for any responses about Gorbachev himself. Was this a case of one person truly making a difference? Or is history "too big" for anyone person to make much difference at all even though they may appear to at the time? Would the usually routine matter of Vladimir Scherbitsky's plane taking off at the proper time from San Francisco, and Kunayev arriving in Moscow the day of the leadership decision have changed history greatly? Is it silly to think about questions such as these anyway, as we only have the one timeline (so far:) to go by anyway?! I hope anyone stopping by is having a great weekend, and would love to hear any thoughts about these questions!

The inage is of Gorbachev and his wife Raisa. It appears to have been taken sometime in the mid to late 1980s but I do not know exactly when or where they were.

The Big Questions: Part One

10 March 1985. Night had come to Moscow as the enormous black Zil limousines sped towards the high Kremlin walls. The traffic lights on the 205 foot high Spassky Gate switched automatically to green to all these "first among equals" citizens of the USSR access to their place of power, The guards, still dressed in long winter overcoats and knee-length boots would have sharply saluted their rulers. They also probably wondered what on earth the Politburo members were doing, gathering at 10 pm on a Sunday night. Once inside the Zils would have turned right in front of the Ivan the Great bell tower, completed by Boris Godunov in 1600. Then they would have gone past the glittering cathedrals where the tsars had been crowned and buried for over 300 years. Lastly, the huge limos would have made another right past yet another set of guards and a pair of wrought iron gates, there they finally would have stopped outside a mustard colored palace alongside the Kremlin wall. This three story building was shaped like a three-sided triangle, and formed an inner citadel -a kremlin within the Kremlin.

In tsarist times it had housed the Senate and the Palace of Justice. When Lenin moved the capital back to Moscow from Petrograd in March 1918, the Senate building became the headquarters of the new regime. Almost 70 years of Soviet history had been centered on this building. This was the location from where Lenin ordered the "liquidation" of the tsar and his family. It was from this building that Stalin organized not only a campaign of immense terror on ordinary Soviet citizens-but on his Kremlin colleagues as well! Lavrentiy Beria, another Stalin-inspired monster, had been arrested by his suspicious Politburo members here during Khrushchev's time. Beria and his arrest are worth a couple of articles on their own in the future if I get time.

On this Sunday evening there were to be no arrests. General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Konstantin Chernenko had finally given up the ghost at 7:20 this very evening. For the third time in slightly more than three years the Politburo had to choose a new "Tsar." The Politburo members would have taken an elevator to the third floor of the Senate building. From there they would have seen a long, high-ceilinged corridor with a spotless red runner down the middle and doors on either side. The door one entered would have depended on one's senority. Voting members gathered in a walnut-paneled room, next to the "genseks" (general secretary's) office. Candidate or non-voting, members met with Central Committee secretaries in a more modest room, which had been cheerfully named the predbannik, Russian for the dressing room of a bathhouse. At the appointed time the two groups met in the Politburo Room, greeting each other in a formal yet friendly manner. The reason for the initially divided nature of this unwritten Kremlin tradition was to allow the general secretary to consult with the most senior Soviet leaders before the start of the meeting. Major decisions were often made in the Walnut Room, without any note takers present, and ratified in the Politburo Room.

Mikhail Gorbachev was still not guaranteed the top job as he waited to greet his fellow Politburo members that Sunday evening. Gorbachev had been chairing sessions in Chernenko's abscence (as Chernenko had done in Andropov's abscence), but he was very aware that the old guard wasn't ready to give up yet; even after going through so many leaders in such a short time the situation was becoming the stuff jokes were made of. Gorbachev knew that some of the old guard were wanting the 71 year old Moscow Communist Party boss, Viktor Grishin to get the top job. Grishin had a reputation for corruption and sluggishness that was high even compared to a party boss in one of the outlying Soviet republics. A few weeks earlier Grishin had put on a little theater that he hoped would make people see he was Chernenko's heir apparent by helping the dying leader cast his vote on nationwide television. Prime Minister Tikhonov was at it again behind the scenes to block Gorbachev's candidature. However, rank and file members of the Central Committee were very heavily in favor of Gorbachev. After 13 months and over 18 years (except for a few slight changes under Andropov) both the party and the people were desperate for real change. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was the key figure in this transition. Gromyko was an oldster himself, having served every Soviet leader since Stalin. He had joined the Communist Party in 1931-the year Gorbachev was born. Now that Defense Minister Ustinov was dead, there was no other man in the Politburo who could match his influence and prestige. To be continued...

I am kind of going crazy getting information I had written down here while I can type halfway decently. This is indeed a new series but I very much intend to go back to Rome very soon. The two different subjects will run simultaneously. In this series (which by the way I do not like the name-so any suggestions other than "The Big Questions" will be appreciated!) I just want to ask major questions of history and see if there are any answers. Things like: Can one person make a difference? What causes a nation to rise, stagnate or fall completely? Maybe even questions like: Do conspiracies play a major role in history? (conspiracies do not always have to be major to make a difference. Hopefully we will see shortly how if we believe one person can make a difference in the Gorbachev succession- a very tiny conspiracy may have ended up playing a major part-it then boils down if one believes a single man or woman can make a difference when confronted with the overwhelming tides of history.) These are pretty much the questions I started this blog for and wound up getting so wrapped up in Roman history ( but will definitely continue with that also, God willing) that I forgot-especially as I had a long spell on this blog without doing anything. If I am offline tomorrow, I hope to be online Friday. All the best to anyone stopping by!

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Conclusion

President Reagan seems to have been surprised when he learned in late 1983 that "many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans...as potential aggressors who might hurl weapons at them in a first strike." Well if Reagan paid a bit more attention to our nation's interfering in the affairs of others and using "phony" provocations to start conflicts-maybe he would not have been as surprised. Reagan also appears to have had his horror of a nuclear war strengthened by watching a preview of the 1983 ABC television movie The Day After, which showed the destruction of Lawrence, Kansas, after a nuclear exchange with the Soviets. This probably shouldn't have come as a surprise for a president who always seemed to be "acting" and who quoted events from movies as if they happened in real life. However, this time Reagan being influenced by a movie was probably a good thing. Typically some administration officials felt that the ABC movie could play right into the hands of Soviet propagandists, but their commander in chief had a completely different view. In his diary, Reagan noted: It's powerfully done, all $7 million worth. It's very effective and left me very depressed. We have to do all we can to have a deterrent and to see there is never a nuclear war."

Even so there wouldn't be any great changes in superpower relations as long as the old guard remained in power. Yuri Andropov had wanted badly for his protege, Mikhail Gorbachev, to be his successor. Andropov's wishes were denied by a septugenarian cabal that wasn't ready (and perhaps never would be until they all died!) to hand the reigns of power to a new generation. When Andropov died on 9 February 1984, the post of general secretary passed to the semi-comatose Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko-the man who had once held so much sway over Brezhnev's cigarettes! Chernenko was already a dying man upon his succession. Gorbachev's hopes of getting the top job were scotched by the 78 year old Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. In a conversation with his colleagues Tikhonov was overheard saying, "Mikhail is still very young. It's unclear how he would behave in such a position. Kostya is the one we need." The geriatrics had their way this time, and would even give it another go when Chernenko died only 13 months later.

I have probably gone further into this article about other subjects than KAL 007 than I intended. I will end this series by saying a couple of things about the shootdown. First of all, the Cold War was an enormous waste of human resources. I can start to get really upset if I begin to think about where humanity would be if we humans didn't have this endless propensity for violence-and sorry to sound crude but this constant battle between nations and their propagandists to "see whose dick is bigger?" And what are those missiles that can wipe out whole cities (or if they have multiple warheads -multiple cities) at one go, if not hugely phallic symbols? In my very humble opinion I am surprised, but very pleasantly surprised that we "made" it through the Cold War intact. Korean Air Lines Flight 007 is a terrible and tragic reminder that the Cold War did kill people. This is what I think the tragedy boils down to: the people aboard that doomed flight were victims of the Cold War. There are a number of conspiracy theories from the left and the right about this incident. In a way that is sad too, that one's opinion of what happened would be based only on politics and not where the evidence leads.

The right-wing conspiracy theories say that the Soviets knew exactly what they were shooting down and then many of them go on to say the downing was because of Larry McDonald, the very anti-Soviet congressman from Georgia's seventh district who was on KAL 007. The left-wing conspiracy theories say that KAL 007 was on an out and out spying mission for the United States to see how fast the Soviet Union's radar and military would respond to an intruder-and how well it would respond. Note: as with many conspiracy theories there are many variations around these two themes-these are just the major ones. With KAL 007 I don't think there is enough information to judge what happened either way and tend towards the extremely tragic mistake explanation. I will say that I truly do not believe that Gennady Osipovich knew he was taking down a plane full of civilians at first, and I will also say that this doesn't excuse the lies the Soviets told about the incident. The terribly cold and beaureaucratic way high Soviet officials acted is also inexcusable. Against "our" side I will say that I do wonder why such an experienced pilot as Captain Chun missed so many chances to see that his plane was way off course. Remember he was a very experienced pilot and trusted so well that he served South Korean leaders as a pilot. I also have no doubt that there are those in our "security" agencies who might see a civilian plane going off course and let it stay that way as opposed to warning it to gain data about Soviet defenses-perhaps thinking the plane would simply be "escorted" out of Soviet airspace instead of being blown out of the sky.

I will add just a couple more thoughts and would love to hear from anyone with anything to say. I would also like to dedicate this little series to the victims and their families and friends of Korean Air Lines 007. My whole point in doing this series was to hopefully show that not only did people die during the Cold War but that it was a terrble waste of every kind of resource imaginable. I can only hope, along with millions-maybe billions of others that mankind learns to be -well more of what it is supposed to mean to be human in the future!

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Pt Six

For a time Major Gennady Osipovich had been on cloud -perhaps he felt that he would be named for the enormous honor of Hero of the Soviet Union for shooting down a foreign military craft. However, now that he knew what had actually happened, his mental anguish and regret was so great he could hardly conceal his feelings -and sometimes couldn't. During this time, Osipovich was described as listless, distracted and in his own world. Out of the blue and addressing no particular person, Osipovich would say things like: "Perhaps there was no one on the plane," and "Who can tell me exactly how many seats there are on this Boeing." Osipovich had been greeted like a hero when he came back from his mission. Indeed, the entire squadron had come to welcome the man who had shot down an "intruder." There had been much celebration at the time, hugs, kisses and many shots of vodka consumed. The younger pilots looked at him with a mixture of jealousy and pride. Gennady Osipovich may have had a premonition of something because during the celebratory time he phoned General Kornukov to find out what had actually taken place, asking if the plane had been "one of ours."

Kornukov replied sternly, "No. It was a foreigner. So make a hole in your shoulder boards for a new star." Shortly there was a different attitude in the air. Western radio stations reported that the Soviet Union had shot down a passenger plane, killing all 269 people aboard. Government officials arrived on Osipovich's turf from Moscow with endless questions and investigations. Major Osipovich's superiors, well-schooled in holding their cards close to their chests began to look at Osipovich with strange expressions. When interviewed by a reporter from the army newspaper Red Star, Osipovich complained: "Why are they treating me as if I am insane?" and "For days I have not even been able to go to the bathroom by myself. They keep me locked up." This journalist and others had been completely prepared by Moscow. Their mission: to get Osipovich to agree to the official Party line about shooting down a 'spy plane.' This of course meant repeating the same lies and obfuscations that the USSR had been telling the rest of the world. The entire script that Osipovich was to read on camera, on state TV had already been written in Moscow. The only thing that Osipovich needed to do was memorize his lines and repeat them on TV. Osipovich followed his instructions, but the first time around his performance and believeablity seemed terribly contrived.

A bottle of vodka was produced and brought out and he drank several shots in quick succession. Osipovich was much more relaxed now. When he got back in front of the TV cameras this time, his words of outrage, resentment and scorn issued from his mouth spontaneously and very importantly "sounded true." Not only did Osipovich talk about the threat of a nuclear war, he even mentioned how he had been scheduled to give a speech about peace to a school in Sakhalin the very same day that the United States had run its mission of "provocation." The television presenter then asked if he was positive that the intruder had been an ememy plane. "Yes, this is what I thought. After it crossed our border, it only made me more certain. This enemy aircraft which had broken into our territory was now flying over my home. It passed almost over our base. People at this time are peacefully sleeping and he's up there on a spying mission." The KAL 007 affair was a horrific but cathartic affair for both superpowers. This incident brought them closer to a nuclear holocaust than any time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Oddly, however, it also began, very slowly at first, to begin a new era of East-West relations. Once again it was as if the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States came to the edge of the abyss-looked down and got scared-then came back from the edge. The rhetoric between the two superpowers at this time was extreme.

The Reagan administration accused the Soviets of "a crime against humanity" and the deliberate "massacre" of 269 innocent civilians. The Soviets fought back, comparing Reagan to Adolph Hitler (this seems to be a favorite insult for any two powers having significant disagreements), and a demagogue who wanted to rule the world-even if he had to destroy it first. This war of propaganda and accusations happened during the time of another war of propaganda between Washington and Moscow. This involved the deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Western Europe by the Reagan administration. If the Soviets could only convince public opinion in Europe that Reagan was pushing the world towards a nuclear confrontation; their battle against the Pershings was almost won. To counter this the Reagan administration sought to present itself as tough but reasonable. The Korean airline tragedy was a major public relations disaster for Moscow. It is quite possible that this horrible tragedy aided the Reagan administration to deploy the Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe right on schedule. The Soviets had lost this round of the public opinion wars. Here I will enter a personal note. I was in Europe as a teenager in the summer of 1982-and to a person everyone I met-be they German, Austrian, Swiss or British thought that the quest to have the Pershings installed was a terrible idea. The KAL tragedy, sadly, may have helped the governments cooperating with the Reagan administration to "stand down" public opinion.

However, there was another way that the KAL tragedy, ironically, may have helped Andropov. The reaction in Moscow had convinced President Reagan that it would be stupid to push the Soviets too far. A state that felt it was cornered and being treated unfairly might strike back in terrible and unpredictable ways. OK-we are now quite close to the end of the KAL 007 series. I could have typed more tonight were I not extremely fumble-fingered-and it has gotten worse and not better since I have been online. I have made about one typo for every four words in this article! Being the first of September, this is the 26th anniversary of the horrible KAL 007 tragedy and I would like to say that my thoughts and prayers go out to the families and friends of the victims of this stupid and preventable Cold War tragedy. The image is of a memorial to the victims of the KAL 007 shootdown in Japan-I will come back with the exact location. Peace and best to anyone stopping by! The memorial is located at Cape Soya, Japan. In the wiki link I will give there is a picture of it under the "Aftermath" section. There are a huge amount of web resources on this tragedy and I would recommend to anyone interested to read them including the wikipedia article HERE