The Big Questions: Part Two

There were certain things that Gromyko didn't agree with Gorbachev about. Gromyko, who had been in so very many foreign nations during his tenure, was slightly put-off or jealous of the glowing reviews that Mikhail Gorbachev had received during a tour of Britain in December 1984. This was the time that Thatcher expressed her "I like Mr Gorbachev; we can do business together" opinion. Andrei Gromyko's own son, Anatoly, was a strong Gorbachev supporter. Gromyko was nothing if not a realist. He simply reviewed the situation and decided the age of the dinosaurs was over. By helping Gorbachev win the post of general secretary, Gromyko would be the elder statesman of the USSR. Several minutes before the arrival of everyone else, Gromyko and Gorbachev met in the Walnut Room. Gorbachev told Gromyko, "We have to unite our forces. This is a critical moment." In reply Gromyko said, "It seems to me that everything is clear." Mikhail Gorbachev was now completely confident he had Gromyko's support and finally stated, "I am counting on the fact that you and I will cooperate."

Gorbachev then offered Viktor Grishin what would appear to us in the West as a consolation prize. However, in the Byzantine world of Soviet politics things were never quite so clear cut. Gorbachev had offered Grishin the chairmanship of Chernenko's Funeral Commission. Grishin may have been crooked but he was no dummy. If he accepted this prestigious but only symbolic position he might appear to be making yet another bid for power. If his Kremlin colleagues perceive him as too overreaching it could have dire consequences for his political career. Grishin told Gorbachev something to the effect that the Funeral Commission position usually went to the person acting in the general secretary's place when he couldn't be present, which had been Gorbachev himself. Grishin urged Gorbachev to handle the job in hopes that some of the old guard would resist him. Gorbachev who had just turned 54 on 2 March 1985, was indeed the "baby" of the Politburo-but was no fool either. He thought that his power base would expand and said to Grishin, "There's no need to hurry. Let's think about this carefully overnight."

When Gorbachev entered the Politburo Room, he still kept a respectful distance from the now empty general secretary's seat. The mood in the room was still guarded-more like "The king is dead" instead of "Long live the king." The men listened to a number of minor matters including the medical report about the death of Konstantin Chernenko. They prepared an obituary for him, picked a date for the funeral and began summoning members of he policy making Central Committee to Moscow. Then Gromyko made his move. He insisted that Gorbachev be appointed chairman of the Funeral Commission. This was Gromyko's way of saying in no uncertain terms that he supported Gorbachev's bid to become general secretary. There were a few dissenting voices about the unnecessary speed of his suggestion but no one opposed his proposal. Along with Andrei Gromyko, Gorbachev had another indispensable supporter from when Gorbachev had worked in the Central Committee in Moscow. This man's name was Yegor Ligachev, and he was the secretary in charge of cadres. Ligachev was another Andropov appointee who had been chosen for his Siberian toughness and appetite for hard work to purge the party of incompetent officials.

Ligachev, like Gorbachev was appalled at the corruption and drift of the Brezhnev years. Over the last three years, Ligachev had been traveling all over the Soviet Union replacing old Brezhnev cadres with younger men. Ligachev knew the ins and outs of the network of party officials who ran the nation on a day to day basis. 40 percent of the seats on the Central Committee were held by these regional party bosses. Back in 1964 these were the same kind of men who played a major role in ousting Nikita Khrushchev. This fact could become critical. If there was a deadlock in the Politburo, which there would be if Viktor Grishin continued his drive for power, the decision of these men and women would be decisive. Yegor Ligachev had counted heads-they were almost all in favor of Gorbachev by a great percentage.

Then there is another item of interest in our story here. Two long time Brezhnev cronies, who most likely would have supported Grishin were absent from the crucial meeting. The Ukrainian Communist Party boss, Vladimir V. Scherbitsky, was in San Francisco on an official visit. His flight home was mysteriously delayed-until the question of who would be the next gensek had been decided. Dinmukhhamed Kunayev, the Communist Party boss of Kazakhstan and a longtime Brezhnev colleague didn't get to Moscow from Alma Ata until the day after the leadership question had been decided. There wasn't much said about Kunayev's late arrival but Kremlin watchers and conspiracy theorists suspected a plot by the pro-Gorbachev forces to delay Scherbitsky's plane in San Francisco. This incident could have simply been timing-or simple cooincidence but as always for me anyway gives something to wonder about.

Might Soviet and perhaps world history been vastly different with Communist Party General Secretary Viktor Grishin instead of Mikhail Gorbachev? Would the Cold War between the superpowers have heated up further-maybe even becoming a "hot" war? Or would the superpowers simply have continued to walk the tightrope above nuclear holocaust as they already had for so many years? After Grishin would a reformer have arrived on the scene anyway-but maybe in the 90s instead of the 80s? There is much speculation about this question to people who study the "what ifs" or "might have beens" of history. Many of the men who helped Gorbachev originally insisted that they never realized how far he would take things, and blamed him for letting the reforms get out of control and thus ending the Soviet Union. This group of men includes Yegor Ligachev, who by 1988 was quite bitter about how far Mikhail Gorbachev had gone. Some say with or without reform the Soviet Union would have been gone anyway. I haven't yet made up my mind about this question and it may be one that is unknowable to any degree of satisfaction. One thing I do think is that the Soviet Union could have staggered on much longer than the early nineties without reform-doomed eventually maybe-but not as quickly as some analysts would have it. Finally, I would be fascinated for any responses about Gorbachev himself. Was this a case of one person truly making a difference? Or is history "too big" for anyone person to make much difference at all even though they may appear to at the time? Would the usually routine matter of Vladimir Scherbitsky's plane taking off at the proper time from San Francisco, and Kunayev arriving in Moscow the day of the leadership decision have changed history greatly? Is it silly to think about questions such as these anyway, as we only have the one timeline (so far:) to go by anyway?! I hope anyone stopping by is having a great weekend, and would love to hear any thoughts about these questions!

The inage is of Gorbachev and his wife Raisa. It appears to have been taken sometime in the mid to late 1980s but I do not know exactly when or where they were.

The Big Questions: Part One

10 March 1985. Night had come to Moscow as the enormous black Zil limousines sped towards the high Kremlin walls. The traffic lights on the 205 foot high Spassky Gate switched automatically to green to all these "first among equals" citizens of the USSR access to their place of power, The guards, still dressed in long winter overcoats and knee-length boots would have sharply saluted their rulers. They also probably wondered what on earth the Politburo members were doing, gathering at 10 pm on a Sunday night. Once inside the Zils would have turned right in front of the Ivan the Great bell tower, completed by Boris Godunov in 1600. Then they would have gone past the glittering cathedrals where the tsars had been crowned and buried for over 300 years. Lastly, the huge limos would have made another right past yet another set of guards and a pair of wrought iron gates, there they finally would have stopped outside a mustard colored palace alongside the Kremlin wall. This three story building was shaped like a three-sided triangle, and formed an inner citadel -a kremlin within the Kremlin.

In tsarist times it had housed the Senate and the Palace of Justice. When Lenin moved the capital back to Moscow from Petrograd in March 1918, the Senate building became the headquarters of the new regime. Almost 70 years of Soviet history had been centered on this building. This was the location from where Lenin ordered the "liquidation" of the tsar and his family. It was from this building that Stalin organized not only a campaign of immense terror on ordinary Soviet citizens-but on his Kremlin colleagues as well! Lavrentiy Beria, another Stalin-inspired monster, had been arrested by his suspicious Politburo members here during Khrushchev's time. Beria and his arrest are worth a couple of articles on their own in the future if I get time.

On this Sunday evening there were to be no arrests. General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Konstantin Chernenko had finally given up the ghost at 7:20 this very evening. For the third time in slightly more than three years the Politburo had to choose a new "Tsar." The Politburo members would have taken an elevator to the third floor of the Senate building. From there they would have seen a long, high-ceilinged corridor with a spotless red runner down the middle and doors on either side. The door one entered would have depended on one's senority. Voting members gathered in a walnut-paneled room, next to the "genseks" (general secretary's) office. Candidate or non-voting, members met with Central Committee secretaries in a more modest room, which had been cheerfully named the predbannik, Russian for the dressing room of a bathhouse. At the appointed time the two groups met in the Politburo Room, greeting each other in a formal yet friendly manner. The reason for the initially divided nature of this unwritten Kremlin tradition was to allow the general secretary to consult with the most senior Soviet leaders before the start of the meeting. Major decisions were often made in the Walnut Room, without any note takers present, and ratified in the Politburo Room.

Mikhail Gorbachev was still not guaranteed the top job as he waited to greet his fellow Politburo members that Sunday evening. Gorbachev had been chairing sessions in Chernenko's abscence (as Chernenko had done in Andropov's abscence), but he was very aware that the old guard wasn't ready to give up yet; even after going through so many leaders in such a short time the situation was becoming the stuff jokes were made of. Gorbachev knew that some of the old guard were wanting the 71 year old Moscow Communist Party boss, Viktor Grishin to get the top job. Grishin had a reputation for corruption and sluggishness that was high even compared to a party boss in one of the outlying Soviet republics. A few weeks earlier Grishin had put on a little theater that he hoped would make people see he was Chernenko's heir apparent by helping the dying leader cast his vote on nationwide television. Prime Minister Tikhonov was at it again behind the scenes to block Gorbachev's candidature. However, rank and file members of the Central Committee were very heavily in favor of Gorbachev. After 13 months and over 18 years (except for a few slight changes under Andropov) both the party and the people were desperate for real change. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was the key figure in this transition. Gromyko was an oldster himself, having served every Soviet leader since Stalin. He had joined the Communist Party in 1931-the year Gorbachev was born. Now that Defense Minister Ustinov was dead, there was no other man in the Politburo who could match his influence and prestige. To be continued...

I am kind of going crazy getting information I had written down here while I can type halfway decently. This is indeed a new series but I very much intend to go back to Rome very soon. The two different subjects will run simultaneously. In this series (which by the way I do not like the name-so any suggestions other than "The Big Questions" will be appreciated!) I just want to ask major questions of history and see if there are any answers. Things like: Can one person make a difference? What causes a nation to rise, stagnate or fall completely? Maybe even questions like: Do conspiracies play a major role in history? (conspiracies do not always have to be major to make a difference. Hopefully we will see shortly how if we believe one person can make a difference in the Gorbachev succession- a very tiny conspiracy may have ended up playing a major part-it then boils down if one believes a single man or woman can make a difference when confronted with the overwhelming tides of history.) These are pretty much the questions I started this blog for and wound up getting so wrapped up in Roman history ( but will definitely continue with that also, God willing) that I forgot-especially as I had a long spell on this blog without doing anything. If I am offline tomorrow, I hope to be online Friday. All the best to anyone stopping by!

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Conclusion

President Reagan seems to have been surprised when he learned in late 1983 that "many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans...as potential aggressors who might hurl weapons at them in a first strike." Well if Reagan paid a bit more attention to our nation's interfering in the affairs of others and using "phony" provocations to start conflicts-maybe he would not have been as surprised. Reagan also appears to have had his horror of a nuclear war strengthened by watching a preview of the 1983 ABC television movie The Day After, which showed the destruction of Lawrence, Kansas, after a nuclear exchange with the Soviets. This probably shouldn't have come as a surprise for a president who always seemed to be "acting" and who quoted events from movies as if they happened in real life. However, this time Reagan being influenced by a movie was probably a good thing. Typically some administration officials felt that the ABC movie could play right into the hands of Soviet propagandists, but their commander in chief had a completely different view. In his diary, Reagan noted: It's powerfully done, all $7 million worth. It's very effective and left me very depressed. We have to do all we can to have a deterrent and to see there is never a nuclear war."

Even so there wouldn't be any great changes in superpower relations as long as the old guard remained in power. Yuri Andropov had wanted badly for his protege, Mikhail Gorbachev, to be his successor. Andropov's wishes were denied by a septugenarian cabal that wasn't ready (and perhaps never would be until they all died!) to hand the reigns of power to a new generation. When Andropov died on 9 February 1984, the post of general secretary passed to the semi-comatose Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko-the man who had once held so much sway over Brezhnev's cigarettes! Chernenko was already a dying man upon his succession. Gorbachev's hopes of getting the top job were scotched by the 78 year old Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. In a conversation with his colleagues Tikhonov was overheard saying, "Mikhail is still very young. It's unclear how he would behave in such a position. Kostya is the one we need." The geriatrics had their way this time, and would even give it another go when Chernenko died only 13 months later.

I have probably gone further into this article about other subjects than KAL 007 than I intended. I will end this series by saying a couple of things about the shootdown. First of all, the Cold War was an enormous waste of human resources. I can start to get really upset if I begin to think about where humanity would be if we humans didn't have this endless propensity for violence-and sorry to sound crude but this constant battle between nations and their propagandists to "see whose dick is bigger?" And what are those missiles that can wipe out whole cities (or if they have multiple warheads -multiple cities) at one go, if not hugely phallic symbols? In my very humble opinion I am surprised, but very pleasantly surprised that we "made" it through the Cold War intact. Korean Air Lines Flight 007 is a terrible and tragic reminder that the Cold War did kill people. This is what I think the tragedy boils down to: the people aboard that doomed flight were victims of the Cold War. There are a number of conspiracy theories from the left and the right about this incident. In a way that is sad too, that one's opinion of what happened would be based only on politics and not where the evidence leads.

The right-wing conspiracy theories say that the Soviets knew exactly what they were shooting down and then many of them go on to say the downing was because of Larry McDonald, the very anti-Soviet congressman from Georgia's seventh district who was on KAL 007. The left-wing conspiracy theories say that KAL 007 was on an out and out spying mission for the United States to see how fast the Soviet Union's radar and military would respond to an intruder-and how well it would respond. Note: as with many conspiracy theories there are many variations around these two themes-these are just the major ones. With KAL 007 I don't think there is enough information to judge what happened either way and tend towards the extremely tragic mistake explanation. I will say that I truly do not believe that Gennady Osipovich knew he was taking down a plane full of civilians at first, and I will also say that this doesn't excuse the lies the Soviets told about the incident. The terribly cold and beaureaucratic way high Soviet officials acted is also inexcusable. Against "our" side I will say that I do wonder why such an experienced pilot as Captain Chun missed so many chances to see that his plane was way off course. Remember he was a very experienced pilot and trusted so well that he served South Korean leaders as a pilot. I also have no doubt that there are those in our "security" agencies who might see a civilian plane going off course and let it stay that way as opposed to warning it to gain data about Soviet defenses-perhaps thinking the plane would simply be "escorted" out of Soviet airspace instead of being blown out of the sky.

I will add just a couple more thoughts and would love to hear from anyone with anything to say. I would also like to dedicate this little series to the victims and their families and friends of Korean Air Lines 007. My whole point in doing this series was to hopefully show that not only did people die during the Cold War but that it was a terrble waste of every kind of resource imaginable. I can only hope, along with millions-maybe billions of others that mankind learns to be -well more of what it is supposed to mean to be human in the future!

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Pt Six

For a time Major Gennady Osipovich had been on cloud -perhaps he felt that he would be named for the enormous honor of Hero of the Soviet Union for shooting down a foreign military craft. However, now that he knew what had actually happened, his mental anguish and regret was so great he could hardly conceal his feelings -and sometimes couldn't. During this time, Osipovich was described as listless, distracted and in his own world. Out of the blue and addressing no particular person, Osipovich would say things like: "Perhaps there was no one on the plane," and "Who can tell me exactly how many seats there are on this Boeing." Osipovich had been greeted like a hero when he came back from his mission. Indeed, the entire squadron had come to welcome the man who had shot down an "intruder." There had been much celebration at the time, hugs, kisses and many shots of vodka consumed. The younger pilots looked at him with a mixture of jealousy and pride. Gennady Osipovich may have had a premonition of something because during the celebratory time he phoned General Kornukov to find out what had actually taken place, asking if the plane had been "one of ours."

Kornukov replied sternly, "No. It was a foreigner. So make a hole in your shoulder boards for a new star." Shortly there was a different attitude in the air. Western radio stations reported that the Soviet Union had shot down a passenger plane, killing all 269 people aboard. Government officials arrived on Osipovich's turf from Moscow with endless questions and investigations. Major Osipovich's superiors, well-schooled in holding their cards close to their chests began to look at Osipovich with strange expressions. When interviewed by a reporter from the army newspaper Red Star, Osipovich complained: "Why are they treating me as if I am insane?" and "For days I have not even been able to go to the bathroom by myself. They keep me locked up." This journalist and others had been completely prepared by Moscow. Their mission: to get Osipovich to agree to the official Party line about shooting down a 'spy plane.' This of course meant repeating the same lies and obfuscations that the USSR had been telling the rest of the world. The entire script that Osipovich was to read on camera, on state TV had already been written in Moscow. The only thing that Osipovich needed to do was memorize his lines and repeat them on TV. Osipovich followed his instructions, but the first time around his performance and believeablity seemed terribly contrived.

A bottle of vodka was produced and brought out and he drank several shots in quick succession. Osipovich was much more relaxed now. When he got back in front of the TV cameras this time, his words of outrage, resentment and scorn issued from his mouth spontaneously and very importantly "sounded true." Not only did Osipovich talk about the threat of a nuclear war, he even mentioned how he had been scheduled to give a speech about peace to a school in Sakhalin the very same day that the United States had run its mission of "provocation." The television presenter then asked if he was positive that the intruder had been an ememy plane. "Yes, this is what I thought. After it crossed our border, it only made me more certain. This enemy aircraft which had broken into our territory was now flying over my home. It passed almost over our base. People at this time are peacefully sleeping and he's up there on a spying mission." The KAL 007 affair was a horrific but cathartic affair for both superpowers. This incident brought them closer to a nuclear holocaust than any time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Oddly, however, it also began, very slowly at first, to begin a new era of East-West relations. Once again it was as if the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States came to the edge of the abyss-looked down and got scared-then came back from the edge. The rhetoric between the two superpowers at this time was extreme.

The Reagan administration accused the Soviets of "a crime against humanity" and the deliberate "massacre" of 269 innocent civilians. The Soviets fought back, comparing Reagan to Adolph Hitler (this seems to be a favorite insult for any two powers having significant disagreements), and a demagogue who wanted to rule the world-even if he had to destroy it first. This war of propaganda and accusations happened during the time of another war of propaganda between Washington and Moscow. This involved the deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Western Europe by the Reagan administration. If the Soviets could only convince public opinion in Europe that Reagan was pushing the world towards a nuclear confrontation; their battle against the Pershings was almost won. To counter this the Reagan administration sought to present itself as tough but reasonable. The Korean airline tragedy was a major public relations disaster for Moscow. It is quite possible that this horrible tragedy aided the Reagan administration to deploy the Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe right on schedule. The Soviets had lost this round of the public opinion wars. Here I will enter a personal note. I was in Europe as a teenager in the summer of 1982-and to a person everyone I met-be they German, Austrian, Swiss or British thought that the quest to have the Pershings installed was a terrible idea. The KAL tragedy, sadly, may have helped the governments cooperating with the Reagan administration to "stand down" public opinion.

However, there was another way that the KAL tragedy, ironically, may have helped Andropov. The reaction in Moscow had convinced President Reagan that it would be stupid to push the Soviets too far. A state that felt it was cornered and being treated unfairly might strike back in terrible and unpredictable ways. OK-we are now quite close to the end of the KAL 007 series. I could have typed more tonight were I not extremely fumble-fingered-and it has gotten worse and not better since I have been online. I have made about one typo for every four words in this article! Being the first of September, this is the 26th anniversary of the horrible KAL 007 tragedy and I would like to say that my thoughts and prayers go out to the families and friends of the victims of this stupid and preventable Cold War tragedy. The image is of a memorial to the victims of the KAL 007 shootdown in Japan-I will come back with the exact location. Peace and best to anyone stopping by! The memorial is located at Cape Soya, Japan. In the wiki link I will give there is a picture of it under the "Aftermath" section. There are a huge amount of web resources on this tragedy and I would recommend to anyone interested to read them including the wikipedia article HERE

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Pt Five

Many commentators and historians have argued over the years about the notion of there being "hawks" and "doves" in the Kremlin. After studying Soviet history (albeit as a complete amateur for 30 years), I do believe that there were men in the Soviet government who wanted peace more than others, the problem is the only way for a dove to survive surrounded by hawks is to at least appear to be a hawk himself. Second of all, I believe that with the majority of the Soviet leadership, feelings of peace towards the West were greatly enhanced by what they could get out of cooperating and signing treaties with the US and other nations-detente. I also want to say that here it would be very hypocritical for me not to say that the same type of things could also be said of the United States. For the number of Soviets who no doubt would have been relieved if the United States were wiped off the face of the earth-there was a huge contingent of people in the United States who would have been happy to see the same thing happen with the Soviets. In the area of propaganda the United States -in my opinion anyway-intentionally overestimated the "threat" the Soviet Union posed to bloat the already hugely bloated defense industry or military-industrial complex (MIC). There was an enormous amount of hatred and mistrust whipped up by both sides of the Cold War.

Matters were not helped any in 1984 when President Reagan, who didn't realize he was talking into a "live" mike said, "I have just signed a bill outlawing the Soviet Union forever. Bombing begins in five minutes." I may not have the exact quote -but its damn close and it was a hugely stupid thing for Reagan to say-both as a head of state and as a human being. For once the "luck" that seemed to follow Reagan through a great deal of his presidency seemed to have slipped -at least for a moment. Looking back on it, I don't think the aftermath of the "bombing begins in five minutes" incident lasted that long. Forgive me please for digressing (yet again-a rather common thing with me) but does anyone else who was around in the early 80s feel that if any other prez had dealt with the PATCO strike like Reagan did -that if it were any other prez-I feel that within a couple of weeks a huge airline catastrophe would have happened-and thank god it didn't. But what really gets me after these years is that in some quarters in the US Reagan is on his way to being deified and -I suppose it just shows you what can be done with the right sound-bites and Madison Avenue marketing. To me the man was an absolute bore and completely uninspiring (haha-there was the "small" matter of him edging the US closer to a nuclear exchange with the Soviets than any time since 1962!). This may just be a typical left-wing rant but here is my thing with Reagan -he did an excellent job as acting as a president -but I guess that's where I part company with so many. I could always tell it was acting-none of it was real-and he was very good at it -but I could tell almost everything the man said was bullshit!

Sorry about that I will stick to the story from here on out -sheesh as if I am not behind enough! Damn I even lost my place!

Often, survival in the Kremlin meant not survival of the most sophisticated and intelligent -but the blandest and most boring! This meant having a preternatural feel for the upcoming party positions and to agree with them totally-whether you really did or not. Konstantin Chernenko, who would become the general secretary on Andropov's death, chaired the Politburo meeting on the KAL 007 affair because of Andropov's hospitalization. Chernenko was a completely colorless Brezhenev crony. One of Chernenko's responsibilities used to be making sure that Brezhnev didn't smoke over his quota of cigarettes. The Soviet ambassador to the USA, Anatoly Dobrynin, had told a reporter here during the wait and see period after Andropov's death, something to the effect that "The elevation of Konstantin Chernenko to the Communist Party leadership would be an insult to both the Soviet state and people." Once again -relying a lot on memory for that-I will look it up to be sure. Just the fact that Dobrynin wasn't even punished for making such a statement when Chernenko did get the nod-much less called back to Moscow and shot, as he would have been during Stalin's time shows how little respect Chernenko had among many important Soviet officials.

In regard to KAL 007, Chernenko said to the Politburo, "One thing is clear, we cannot allow foreign planes to overfly our territory freely. No self-respecting state can allow that." Defense Minister Ustinov was next to speak. His report to the Politburo contained several major lies, designed to relieve the military of all responsibility for the incident. Unstinov claimed that the 747 was flying "without warning lights," directly contradicted by the testimonyof the interceptor pilot. He also insisted that "repeated instructions" had been given to the intruder to land at a Soviet airfield and that warning shots had been fired "with tracer shells, as stipulated by International rules." Ustinov continued: "My opinion is that in this situation we must show firmness and remain cool. We should not flinch. If we flinch, it gives all kinds of people the opportunity to overfly our territory." Andrei Gromyko, the 74 year old foreign minister was the only Politburo member with the prestige and authority to stand up to Ustinov. And perhaps Gromyko was sorely tempted to do this, as he would bear the brunt of international outrage over the incident. However, Gromyko was always a very cautious man. He had survived Stalin's purges and managed to climb near to the pinnacle of power by always supporting the winning side.

Instead of choosing to debate Ustinov he also caved in, as he didn't want to appear too much like a peacenik during this rapidly escalating incident. Gromyko told the Politburo that the Soviet military had acted "correctly" when it shot down the Korean plane. However, he also acknowledged that the Soviet Union should anticipate a likely barrage of "imperialist propaganda" and admit that "shots were fired." "We should say so frankly, so as not to allow our adversary to accuse us of being deceitful. Our main argument should be that the plane was flying over Soviet territory and had penetrated an exceptionally long way into our territory." It was now Mikhail Gorbachev's turn to speak. The "baby" of the Politburo at 52 years old was in a very fragile position. His colleagues knew he was the one Andropov wanted to be his successor. Andropov had encouraged Gorbachev to get involved in all areas of Soviet government in anticipation of this. The older members of the Politburo needed his youthful energy and competence-but they also felt threatened by him to say the least. It was very hard for them to imagine Gorbachev keeping them around if he came to power, rather than replace them with men closer to his own age. Gorbachev walked a tightrope to retain their confidence and have a realistic chance for the top job.

He had to be an enthusiastic supporter of the Party without threatening any of the vested interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. Gorbachev also took the "safe" line in the Politburo meeting. He told his colleagues that the Americans must have known of this unauthorized violation of Soviet airspace. The length of time that the plane had been in Soviet airspace, two hours, proved that this was a "planned provocation" by the United States. To be continued....

The image is of a plane very similar to what Gennady Osipovich might have thought he was actually firing at. I am exhausted and probably shouldn't even have started this article! Sorry for going off-topic with the "Reagan Rant." I am just amazed so many times how the criminals get away with so much here in the US. O-and any conservatives who might see this-no worries about me. I am voting third party in 2012 and am disgusted with both major politcal parties in our nation right now. I hope to be back online soon with more-hopefully tomorrow. I hope there aren't a huge amount of typos in this-I will try to look real fast. Before finally going offline I will also check for the Dobrynin/Chernenko quote. If it is vastly different than I remember, I will come back and delete it or change it. All the best to anyone stopping by! OK -I am giving myself just a week to confirm the Dobrynin quote about Chernenko. If this were any other area of history I would have taken it down already. Just wanted to come back and let people know to beware of that quote until I can prove it or delete it-maybe someone else will know about it? The second image I brought back is of Chernenko and Brezhnev in happier times-probably the mid to late 1970s with a group of Young Pioneers.

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Pt Four

Yuri Andropov had the view that the key to ruling a country as vast and as teeming with so many different ethnic groups as the USSR was to never show weakness. This stratagem applied to both domestic and foreign policy. The enemies of the revolution were always lying in wait, ready to seize the slightest opportunity should the Soviet leadership show any signs of weakness or a non-united front. To a man of Andropov's thinking, events should never spiral out of control to the point that the onl solution was to use massive military force, as in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. During Politburo meetings before he became general secretary, Andropov was constantly calling for strong measures against dissidents and intellectuals. He was fond of quoting Lenin's views on this, "A revolution is worth something only if it knows how to defend itself." Indeed, for all his knowledge of the true state of the USSR and willingness to experiment, Andropov was a prisoner of the Soviet system as much as the average proletarian worker-although with much better perks and influence! His revolutionary world-view stopped him from challenging the basic features that were actually eroding Soviet power: the overwhelming might of the military-industrial complex; central planning; the elevation of politcal dogma over rational economic thought.

Andropov was also a fervent admirer of Eisenstein's film Ivan the Terrible, which was a very thinly veiled apology for autocratic rule that had been made to order for Stalin. Andropov was particularly fond of a scene early in the movie, when the new tsar is flexing his muscles and trying to impose his will on the rebellious boyars. The boyars say that neither Europe nor Rome will recognize the young tsar, to which a Jesuit priest replies, "He who is strong will be recognized by everybody." Andropov would repeat these words when any argument arose about the need for a tough stance to deal with the American imperialists. Similar to Stalin and Ivan the Terrible, Andropov lived in a world surrounded by plotting domestic enemies and hostile foreign powers. The only possible way to survive in such a world was to be as ruthless, crafty and even as paranoid as your enemies. Military strength was the keystond of the Russian state. The Soviet obsession with security many times undermined their other foreign policy goals when they wanted to be seen as peacemakers. Andropov was very reluctant to go against the ideas of the military-industrial complex. However, when KAL 007 occurred, the Foreign Ministry urged him to assume responsibility for the shootdown, while accusing the United States of orchestrating a deliberate spying mission on the USSR.

But Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, was absolutely against admitting any Soviet role in the destruction of 007. In a conference call to Andropov's hospital room, Ustinov told Andropov, "Don't worry, everything will be all right. Nobody will be able to prove anything." Since Stalin's time, Politburo meetings had followed an exact ritual. The meetings were less a forum for open debate than a weekly loyalty ceremony and rubbing of the elbows for members of the party's inner elite. The agenda for the meeting was usually predetermined by the general secretary and a small number of powerful chieftains, each of whom enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in their particular field of expertise or even moreso if they led one of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics (there were two to three leaders of various Soviet republics in the Politburo at this time if memory serves.) There was always a strict adherence to proper deference shown to the more powerful members around the Politburo table. Junior members were expected to give the floor to their elders and always say something to support the established party doctrine at the time. With this automatic support for a particular decision, they automatically assumed responsibility for it. This process spiralled down repeatedly until it became binding on all of the 18 million Soviet Communists. With the idea of "democratic centralism," once the Politburo had made a formal decision, no dissent was tolerated. Communist ideology by this time had long given way to cynicism. Oh-the Party bosses would still use it to fall back on and slavishly claimed to believe in a "bright Soviet future." But most-by the early 1980s only used lip service to support communist party directives-the revolutionary fires had long burned out for the great majority.

I had no idea this series would be this long! The image is of Major Gennady Osipovich, the pilot who shot down KAL 007. I may try to do one more article for this series today unless I get too tired. Peace and best to anyone stopping by!

Korean Airlines Flight 007: Tragedy & Conspiracy? Pt Three

The passengers aboard Flight 007 were completely unaware of the drama taking place just outside their windows. Some would have covered themselves in blankets and dozed off. Others were waiting for the cabin crew to serve breakfast as the plane flew (supposedly) over Japan to South Korea. Most of the window shades would have still been down for the last part of the in-flight movie. The conversations on the flight deck also show how unaware the crew were of the danger they were in. They talked about upcoming vacations, customs procedures and the location and opening time of the airport currency exchange. The onboard inertial navigation system had failed to engage, either because the pilots had switched it on too late or because someone had flipped the switch to the wrong position.

At the moment, Captain Osipovich had attempted to catch 007's attention with cannon fire, Captain Chun was talking to air traffic control in Tokyo. He got permission to climb two thousand feet to an altitude of 37,000 feet, a normal fuel-saving excercise at this point in the flight. Osipovich interpreted this as an attempt to escape. With 007 heading out of Soviet airspace the generals on the ground were starting to panic. They could face severe consequences if they let a military target get away. There wasn't any time left to ID the target positively; Osipovich was running out of time and fuel. He had only 10 to 15 minutes of flying time left. In theory-and I do wonder why this wasn't tried earlier-perhaps because it had been assumed for so long that the intruder was military-with the Kurile Island incident in the very recent background?) Osipovich could have tried to reach the intruder on the internationally recognized emergency frequency-121.5 Megahertz. However, this meant Osipovich would lose communication with his ground controllers at this crucial time while he retuned his radio-and there was no time for that either.

At 6:21 AM Sakhalin time, just as dawn was arriving, KAL 007 was flying out of Soviet airspace. Kornukov had to make a final decision. His command was: "Fire missiles, fire on target six-zero-six-five, destroy target six-zero-six-five," and finally, "Carry out the task, destroy!" Bring one-six-three in behind Osipovich to guarantee destruction!" "Eight-zero-five, approach target and destroy target!" Osipovich spun around the still unidentified Boeing 747 and launched a heat-seeking missile. 2 seconds later he fired the radar-guided missile. "Launch executed," he radioed to the ground. It only took the missiles 35 seconds to cover the 5 miles between the two planes. Osipovich saw a burst of flame from the tail section. The navigation lights went out immediately. Initially, the plane appeared to climb but as Osipovich swung his jet to the right he could see the "target" falling into the sea. "The target is destroyed," he said in a voice filled with excitement. At the time Osipovich thought he had fulfilled the dream of his career: shooting down a hostile military target.

The destruction of KAL 007 was an enormous gift for President Reagan and the conservative movement in the United States. They could not have asked for a better incident to help label the USSR the "Evil Empire." The Soviets didn't help themselves by denying for almost a week what had happened. The first statement issued by the Soviet news agency TASS-that the plane was flying "without navigation lights," and that the Soviet interceptors had tried to guide the plane to the "nearest airfield" among others were easily destroyed when the Americans simply played a tape of exchanges between Sakahalin ground control and Osipovich to a solemn session of the UN Security Council.

Yuri Andropov had been in power less than 10 months at the time of the KAL incident. He was not a particularly vibrant man on becoming General Secretary, and now after his health eroded at an even faster pace and he was besieged by enormous responsibilities, the new Soviet leader looked like a skeleton. Even his longtime colleagues had trouble recognizing him. Andropov spent much of his time in a hospital that catered to the Soviet higher-ups. His room was a mess of cluttered medical equipment and Kremlin telephones. Andropov sat in a modified dentist's chair with a high headrest that allowed him to shift his position at the touch of a button. His kidneys ceased to function completely in the summer of 1983 and he had to be hooked up to a dialysis machine twice a week. To the average Russian citizen, General Secretary Andropov had become a rather ghostly prescence already-as if he had somehow got stuck on earth when he was supposed to have crossed over. They only heard from him through written statements labeled "from the Soviet leadership; a TASS communique or an interview in Pravda.

The Andropov era had gotten off to a good start in most Soviet citizens' minds-despite typical "dark" jokes such as greeting each other on New Years Day 1983 and saying "Happy New 1938!" -transposing the numbers of the year to signify one of the worst years of Stalin's purges and atrocities. After 18 years of glacial drift and stagnation under Brezhnev most Soviets welcomed change of any kind. They were impressed by Andropov's anti-corruption drive that targeted many former Brezhenev cronies and at the same time helped to glorify the image of the former KGB chief as a stern but just ruler who would get the country back on track and moving again. It appeared for a time that Russsian's finally had a real master -a khozyayin, who would restore dignity, honor, order and discipline to the Soviet Union. By the early 80s the Russian people were desperate for any strong leader. Many Russians acted warmly to even such token steps as a series of raids on Moscow bathhouses in the daytime to punish absenteeism from work. For the Communist Party elite, the sick old man in the dentist's chair was held in regard as the best of his generation.

Andropov's 15 years as the KGB chief had shown him what the true condition of the USSR was and also the extent that it lagged behind the West. In comparison to Brezhnev, Andropov was decisive and energetic. He definitely understood the need for change and was seriously considering new ideas. However, there was a very tough side to Andropov that knew "change" could only go so far-and only under the guidance of the Communist Party. The younger members of the Politburo who had not experienced war or revolution, as Andropov had, perhaps didn't realize that the key to Soviet power was only through the will of a ruthless minority to impose its will on the rest of the nation. In Andropov's mind reform was entirely necessary-but had to be very tightly guided and overseen. To be continued...

Still more to go -but I did get a lot done tonight-for me anway! Peace and be well to anyone stopping by! The first image is of a TIME magazine cover published shortly after the incident. The second image is a few of the faces of the victims of KAL 007.