Yuri Andropov had the view that the key to ruling a country as vast and as teeming with so many different ethnic groups as the USSR was to never show weakness. This stratagem applied to both domestic and foreign policy. The enemies of the revolution were always lying in wait, ready to seize the slightest opportunity should the Soviet leadership show any signs of weakness or a non-united front. To a man of Andropov's thinking, events should never spiral out of control to the point that the onl solution was to use massive military force, as in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. During Politburo meetings before he became general secretary, Andropov was constantly calling for strong measures against dissidents and intellectuals. He was fond of quoting Lenin's views on this, "A revolution is worth something only if it knows how to defend itself." Indeed, for all his knowledge of the true state of the USSR and willingness to experiment, Andropov was a prisoner of the Soviet system as much as the average proletarian worker-although with much better perks and influence! His revolutionary world-view stopped him from challenging the basic features that were actually eroding Soviet power: the overwhelming might of the military-industrial complex; central planning; the elevation of politcal dogma over rational economic thought.
Andropov was also a fervent admirer of Eisenstein's film Ivan the Terrible, which was a very thinly veiled apology for autocratic rule that had been made to order for Stalin. Andropov was particularly fond of a scene early in the movie, when the new tsar is flexing his muscles and trying to impose his will on the rebellious boyars. The boyars say that neither Europe nor Rome will recognize the young tsar, to which a Jesuit priest replies, "He who is strong will be recognized by everybody." Andropov would repeat these words when any argument arose about the need for a tough stance to deal with the American imperialists. Similar to Stalin and Ivan the Terrible, Andropov lived in a world surrounded by plotting domestic enemies and hostile foreign powers. The only possible way to survive in such a world was to be as ruthless, crafty and even as paranoid as your enemies. Military strength was the keystond of the Russian state. The Soviet obsession with security many times undermined their other foreign policy goals when they wanted to be seen as peacemakers. Andropov was very reluctant to go against the ideas of the military-industrial complex. However, when KAL 007 occurred, the Foreign Ministry urged him to assume responsibility for the shootdown, while accusing the United States of orchestrating a deliberate spying mission on the USSR.
But Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, was absolutely against admitting any Soviet role in the destruction of 007. In a conference call to Andropov's hospital room, Ustinov told Andropov, "Don't worry, everything will be all right. Nobody will be able to prove anything." Since Stalin's time, Politburo meetings had followed an exact ritual. The meetings were less a forum for open debate than a weekly loyalty ceremony and rubbing of the elbows for members of the party's inner elite. The agenda for the meeting was usually predetermined by the general secretary and a small number of powerful chieftains, each of whom enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in their particular field of expertise or even moreso if they led one of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics (there were two to three leaders of various Soviet republics in the Politburo at this time if memory serves.) There was always a strict adherence to proper deference shown to the more powerful members around the Politburo table. Junior members were expected to give the floor to their elders and always say something to support the established party doctrine at the time. With this automatic support for a particular decision, they automatically assumed responsibility for it. This process spiralled down repeatedly until it became binding on all of the 18 million Soviet Communists. With the idea of "democratic centralism," once the Politburo had made a formal decision, no dissent was tolerated. Communist ideology by this time had long given way to cynicism. Oh-the Party bosses would still use it to fall back on and slavishly claimed to believe in a "bright Soviet future." But most-by the early 1980s only used lip service to support communist party directives-the revolutionary fires had long burned out for the great majority.
I had no idea this series would be this long! The image is of Major Gennady Osipovich, the pilot who shot down KAL 007. I may try to do one more article for this series today unless I get too tired. Peace and best to anyone stopping by!
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