The Big Questions: Part Two

There were certain things that Gromyko didn't agree with Gorbachev about. Gromyko, who had been in so very many foreign nations during his tenure, was slightly put-off or jealous of the glowing reviews that Mikhail Gorbachev had received during a tour of Britain in December 1984. This was the time that Thatcher expressed her "I like Mr Gorbachev; we can do business together" opinion. Andrei Gromyko's own son, Anatoly, was a strong Gorbachev supporter. Gromyko was nothing if not a realist. He simply reviewed the situation and decided the age of the dinosaurs was over. By helping Gorbachev win the post of general secretary, Gromyko would be the elder statesman of the USSR. Several minutes before the arrival of everyone else, Gromyko and Gorbachev met in the Walnut Room. Gorbachev told Gromyko, "We have to unite our forces. This is a critical moment." In reply Gromyko said, "It seems to me that everything is clear." Mikhail Gorbachev was now completely confident he had Gromyko's support and finally stated, "I am counting on the fact that you and I will cooperate."

Gorbachev then offered Viktor Grishin what would appear to us in the West as a consolation prize. However, in the Byzantine world of Soviet politics things were never quite so clear cut. Gorbachev had offered Grishin the chairmanship of Chernenko's Funeral Commission. Grishin may have been crooked but he was no dummy. If he accepted this prestigious but only symbolic position he might appear to be making yet another bid for power. If his Kremlin colleagues perceive him as too overreaching it could have dire consequences for his political career. Grishin told Gorbachev something to the effect that the Funeral Commission position usually went to the person acting in the general secretary's place when he couldn't be present, which had been Gorbachev himself. Grishin urged Gorbachev to handle the job in hopes that some of the old guard would resist him. Gorbachev who had just turned 54 on 2 March 1985, was indeed the "baby" of the Politburo-but was no fool either. He thought that his power base would expand and said to Grishin, "There's no need to hurry. Let's think about this carefully overnight."

When Gorbachev entered the Politburo Room, he still kept a respectful distance from the now empty general secretary's seat. The mood in the room was still guarded-more like "The king is dead" instead of "Long live the king." The men listened to a number of minor matters including the medical report about the death of Konstantin Chernenko. They prepared an obituary for him, picked a date for the funeral and began summoning members of he policy making Central Committee to Moscow. Then Gromyko made his move. He insisted that Gorbachev be appointed chairman of the Funeral Commission. This was Gromyko's way of saying in no uncertain terms that he supported Gorbachev's bid to become general secretary. There were a few dissenting voices about the unnecessary speed of his suggestion but no one opposed his proposal. Along with Andrei Gromyko, Gorbachev had another indispensable supporter from when Gorbachev had worked in the Central Committee in Moscow. This man's name was Yegor Ligachev, and he was the secretary in charge of cadres. Ligachev was another Andropov appointee who had been chosen for his Siberian toughness and appetite for hard work to purge the party of incompetent officials.

Ligachev, like Gorbachev was appalled at the corruption and drift of the Brezhnev years. Over the last three years, Ligachev had been traveling all over the Soviet Union replacing old Brezhnev cadres with younger men. Ligachev knew the ins and outs of the network of party officials who ran the nation on a day to day basis. 40 percent of the seats on the Central Committee were held by these regional party bosses. Back in 1964 these were the same kind of men who played a major role in ousting Nikita Khrushchev. This fact could become critical. If there was a deadlock in the Politburo, which there would be if Viktor Grishin continued his drive for power, the decision of these men and women would be decisive. Yegor Ligachev had counted heads-they were almost all in favor of Gorbachev by a great percentage.

Then there is another item of interest in our story here. Two long time Brezhnev cronies, who most likely would have supported Grishin were absent from the crucial meeting. The Ukrainian Communist Party boss, Vladimir V. Scherbitsky, was in San Francisco on an official visit. His flight home was mysteriously delayed-until the question of who would be the next gensek had been decided. Dinmukhhamed Kunayev, the Communist Party boss of Kazakhstan and a longtime Brezhnev colleague didn't get to Moscow from Alma Ata until the day after the leadership question had been decided. There wasn't much said about Kunayev's late arrival but Kremlin watchers and conspiracy theorists suspected a plot by the pro-Gorbachev forces to delay Scherbitsky's plane in San Francisco. This incident could have simply been timing-or simple cooincidence but as always for me anyway gives something to wonder about.

Might Soviet and perhaps world history been vastly different with Communist Party General Secretary Viktor Grishin instead of Mikhail Gorbachev? Would the Cold War between the superpowers have heated up further-maybe even becoming a "hot" war? Or would the superpowers simply have continued to walk the tightrope above nuclear holocaust as they already had for so many years? After Grishin would a reformer have arrived on the scene anyway-but maybe in the 90s instead of the 80s? There is much speculation about this question to people who study the "what ifs" or "might have beens" of history. Many of the men who helped Gorbachev originally insisted that they never realized how far he would take things, and blamed him for letting the reforms get out of control and thus ending the Soviet Union. This group of men includes Yegor Ligachev, who by 1988 was quite bitter about how far Mikhail Gorbachev had gone. Some say with or without reform the Soviet Union would have been gone anyway. I haven't yet made up my mind about this question and it may be one that is unknowable to any degree of satisfaction. One thing I do think is that the Soviet Union could have staggered on much longer than the early nineties without reform-doomed eventually maybe-but not as quickly as some analysts would have it. Finally, I would be fascinated for any responses about Gorbachev himself. Was this a case of one person truly making a difference? Or is history "too big" for anyone person to make much difference at all even though they may appear to at the time? Would the usually routine matter of Vladimir Scherbitsky's plane taking off at the proper time from San Francisco, and Kunayev arriving in Moscow the day of the leadership decision have changed history greatly? Is it silly to think about questions such as these anyway, as we only have the one timeline (so far:) to go by anyway?! I hope anyone stopping by is having a great weekend, and would love to hear any thoughts about these questions!

The inage is of Gorbachev and his wife Raisa. It appears to have been taken sometime in the mid to late 1980s but I do not know exactly when or where they were.