War Drums Part Six

It is somewhat hard to ascertain what Mark Antony's strategy was when first looking over it. During the two most recent occasions when Greece had been the field of battle, the opposing generals had focused their attention on the north side of the country and the Via Egnatia, the strategically important road to Byzantium and the east. That was where Pompey the Great had based himself in 49 and 48 BC; Brutus and Cassius had marched west along it to be destroyed by Antony and Octavian.

In comparison Antony had no defenses at all north of Corcyra, which was a hundred miles south of the Via Egnatia. Had Octavian wanted to, he could have sailed from Brundisium to Epirus in the hopes of an easy landfall. Some historians have argued that Mark Antony's decision was to cover the route back to Egypt. But it is very improbably that Octavian would have risked his army and fleet on a long jounrey to invade Egypt, assuming that Antony stayed in Greece.

Any invasion of Egypt would have left Italy open to invasion: The one main thing that can be said is that the way Antony had his forces arrayed would protect an escape route to Egypt should that become necessary. A more likely reason for the way Antony's forces were arrayed can be guessed at. The safest and shortest crossing point from Greece to Italy was from the northern parts such as Dyrrachium or Apollonia. By occupying the southern part of Greece, Antony could have been signalling that he had no intention whatsoever of invading the Italian mainland. This would have been important to make known to even his supporters as such a move would have been very unpopular as long as Cleopatra stayed with him.

Antony's plan had almost 100 percent to have been to tempt Octavian to move his army into Greece. Antony and Cleopatra's fleet at Actium could then move to the north and start a general blockade, stopping any reinforcements and provisions from reaching Octavian's men. Then once the trap was sprung, the Roman empire's leading commander would delay engaging his former co-ruler in a set-piece battle. With his supply route from Egypt secure, Antony would have an enormous amount of time before beginning any hostilities, whereas Octavian whom Antony knew was already short of money, would soon be short of food and other supplies. Octavian would be closed in and determined to begin hostilities. Mark Antony must have been thinking that from this point of weakness, Octavian and his army could easily be moved into a weak defensive position and destroyed.

On 1 January 31 BC, Octavian now 32 years old, had a constitutional role again as he began his third consulship. His colleague, Marcus Valerius Messala Corvinus, was a former republican, who had been put in the place of the excluded Mark Antony. The consuls, along with 700 senators and a large number of equites marched off towards Brundisium. Octavian had 80,ooo soldiers compared to Antony's 100,000. The difference was mostly made up by the number of Antony's auxiliary or light-armed troops. Octavian's legions were more experienced than Antony's mostly eastern recruits, having been blooded in the recent Illyrian campaign.

Octavian had made it very well known that he expected the senior men in Roman politics to accompany his army. Pollio, a strong-willed man who was almost retired from politics boldly refused, saying to Octavian, "My services to Antony are too great and his kindnesses to me too well known. So I will steer clear of your quarrel and will be a prize for whoever wins." Maecenas, Octavian's other friend from childhood, and whose abilities in any kind of conflict would have been questionable, stayed behind to watch over the political situation in Rome for his friend.

Humiliating and bitter experience had taught Octavian to respect his own constraints as a commander-and he turned once again to his other childhood friend-the indispensable Agrippa to take direct charge of the fleet, and of the battle plan as a whole. When they found out where and how Antony's forces were allayed, the two men agreed on a plan that used surprise and speed to turn the tables on Antony to trap him.

If at all possible, even before winter's end, early March, Agrippa would sail south more than 500 miles to the Peloponnese, the southern half of Greece. Agrippa's objective would be to lay siege and capture the heavily guarded fort of Methone. From this base he would then try to pick off Antony's other garrisons along the Greek coast.

Two positive outcomes for Octavian from this surprise attack were projected: 1) The supply line to Egypt would be severed and Antony's men would soon be short of food. The time pressure would be completely reversed from what Antony imagined. 2) Mark Antony would have to send warships to fight Agrippa and in doing this would weaken his naval garrisons.

I have more information written down that just needs to be typed out so I hope to post again to this blog soon-hopefully within a day or two. Thanks again to anyone commenting or following this blog! The image is just of a Roman mosaic of a fish-no direct relation to the post itself. When I do get further along in the Battle of Actium I would like to have images of maps and things with a direct bearing on the information in the article itself.