The Republic's greatest general could not appear to be afraid of Caesar's legions in Gaul. Pompey's verdict was that Caesar should give up his command the following spring. If this were to happen it would give Cato, or any of his allies plenty of time to prosecute Caesar before the elections for consul later in the year. A question lurking in the background was if Caesar could find a tribune who would veto this. Pompey's reply certainly left no room for doubt about this potential fear, "You might as well ask, what if my son chooses to raise a stick against me?" (Cicero, To Friends, 8.8). At last the gauntlet had been thrown down between the two remaining triumvirs. Caesar saw this as a double-edged insult. The former son-in-law, Pompey, was reversing the status of their relationship and now acting as if he were a father who would punish an errant son. Secondly it was an assault on Caesar's self-interests. The elections of 50 BC brought more bad news for Caesar. The most gifted and charismatic of the tribunes that had been elected was Gaius Scribonius Curio. He had defied Caesar when he had been a consul and people had cheered him for it in the streets. In the intervening nine years relations between the two men had only worsened. Certainly now, citizens could hope Julius Caesar would have to admit defeat. Not quite-in a stunning volte-face, typical of the Republic, Curio had decided to support Caesar! Most assumed he had been bought off with Gallic gold. While this is probably pretty close to the truth it doesn't explain everything. The tribune was also playing a political game that had been played out many times before. By aligning himself with Caesar, Curio was attempting to do what Caesar had done for Pompey and to receive the same largesse for services rendered.
In Dr Tom Holland's book, RVBICON, he brings up some interesting points about the state of affairs that was coming to pass. He refers to one of these ideas as mutual assured destruction-a notion that most of us remember from the cold war. I think Dr Holland applies this concept in a very interesting way to Roman politics. Now would be a good time to quote directly from page 292 of his book: "Throughout the centuries of the Republic's history, its great men had sought to win glory, and to bring their enemies down. Nothing had changed over the years save the scale of opportunites on offer and the scope for mutual assured destruction that they brought. To the Romans of a later age mourning the death of their freedom, this was to be tragically clear. "By now, wrote Petronius of the Republic's last generation, "the conquering Roman had the whole world in his hand, the sea, the course of stars. But still he wanted more." And because he wanted more, he took more; and because he took more he wanted more. It is almost impossible for appetites so monstrous to be sated with the ancient limits of custom and morality. Pompey and Caesar, Rome's greatest conquerors, had won resources for themselves beyond all the imaginings of previous generations. Now the consequences of such obscene power were becoming grimly apparent. Either man had the capability to destroy the Republic. Neither wished to do so, but deterrence, if it were to have any value, obliged both to prepare for the worst. Hence Caesar's recruitment of Curio. So high were the stakes, and so finely poised the equilibrium of power, that the activities of a single tribune, Caesar hoped, might prove sufficient to tip the balance of terror-to make the difference between peace with honor and catastrophe beyond recall. So Curio trusted too."
The image is a map showing ancient Roman jurisdictions of Gaul. I hope to have the next post here soon. Peace and be well to anyone stopping by!
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